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Abstract—This paper deals with the secrecy capacity of the
radio channel in interference-limited regime. We assume that
interferers are uniformly scattered over the network area accord-
ing to a Point Poisson Process and the channel model consists of
path-loss, log-normal shadowing and Nakagami-m fading. Both
the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity and the secrecy
outage probability are then derived in closed-form expressions
using tools of stochastic geometry and higher-order statistics. Our
numerical results show how the secrecy metrics are affected by
the disposition of the desired receiver, the eavesdropper and the
legitimate transmitter.
Index Terms—Composite channel, secrecy capacity, secrecy
outage probability, stochastic geometry
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to their broadcast nature, wireless communications are
susceptible to security issues since non-intended nodes within
the communication range of a given transmitter can overhear
the transmission and possibly extract private information [3].
To ensure confidentiality, cryptographic techniques (usually
implemented in higher layers) depend on secret keys and also
rely on the limited computational power of eavesdroppers
and on the reliability guaranteed by channel coding at the
Physical Layer (PHY). However, future wireless systems tend
to be deployed in large scale with ubiquitous coverage, dy-
namic operation and computational powerful devices, making
encrypted communication through secret keys expensive and
difficult to achieve. PHY security has reemerged [1]–[4] as
a viable alternative to enhance the robustness and reduce the
complexity of conventional cryptography systems since PHY
offers unbreakable and quantifiable secrecy in confidential
bps/Hz, regardless of the eavesdropper’s computational power.
PHY security dates back to 1975, when Wyner in his
pioneering work [5] introduced the wire-tap channel which
is composed of a pair of legitimate users, known as Al-
ice (transmitter) and Bob (receiver), communicating in the
presence of an eavesdropper known as Eve. Alice and Bob
communicate through the main channel in the presence of
Eve, who perceives a degraded version of the message sent
to Bob through the eavesdropper channel. In this context it is
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proved that there exist codes which guarantee both low error
probabilities and a certain degree of confidentiality.
Later in [6], it was demonstrated that the secrecy capacity of
the Gaussian wire-tap channel can be defined as the difference
between the capacity of the main channel and the eavesdropper
channel considering that the eavesdropper channel is noisier
than the main channel. The wire-tap channel is extended
to a fading scenario and secrecy outage probability is then
characterized in [1], [2]. Cooperative and jamming techniques
are reviewed in [4] and diversity schemes are assessed in [7].
Such recent works, however, focus on a small number of
nodes, whose results provide few insights how PHY security
performs in large-scale networks [2, Sec. VIII-C]. Different
from the point-to-point communication wherein secrecy is
guaranteed by keys or tokens, large-scale deployments impose
new challenges to ensure secure communication, due to the
complexity of distributing and maintaining secret keys [8].
Security in large-scale networks are also affected by the
spatial distribution of the interferer nodes and eavesdroppers
(for more details, refer to [2, Sec. VIII-C] and the references
therein). Early contributions aim at characterizing the scaling
laws of secrecy capacity [9] and the network connectivity [10]
of randomly scattered nodes, or at computing the secure area
spectral efficiency for predefined quality requirements. Recent
papers have also shown that PHY-security can compensate for
the vulnerability of wireless communications and reduce its
implementation complexity by exploiting the spatial-temporal
characteristics of the wireless medium [11].
In contrast, we characterize here the secrecy capacity of
large-scale networks in the presence of uncoordinated interfer-
ence by applying a general framework that jointly considers
nodes spatial distribution and composite-fading channel, a
model introduced in [12], [13]. Besides, as most of existing
works consider thermal noise alone to compute the secrecy ca-
pacity, this paper also contributes to the literature by providing
a framework that allows for evaluating the aggregate interfer-
ence and hence computing the non-zero secrecy capacity and
the secrecy outage probability in closed-form.
Built upon the analytic results from [12], [13], we as-
sess the joint effects of transmitter-receiver and transmitter-
eavesdropper relative distances and density interfering nodes
on such capacity metrics. Considering a scenario where inter-
ferers follow a Point Poisson Process and the channel model
consists in path-loss, log-normal shadowing and Nakagami-m
fading, we show under which circumstances non-zero secrecy
capacity is possible and how the secrecy outage probability
behaves in terms of such dynamics.
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2II. SYSTEM MODEL
This section describes the system model used here, follow-
ing the basic concepts introduced in [12, Sec.II]. To begin
with, the tagged legitimate pair is defined as the reference
link (transmitter-receiver) so as to compute the aggregate CCI
and performance metrics for the scenario under consideration.
Specifically the mutual information of the tagged legitimate
pair and its related eavesdropper are determined based on their
instantaneous Signal-to-Interference Ratio (SIR) values. We
adopt the notion for secrecy capacity, probability of existence
of non-zero secrecy capacity and secrecy outage probability
as in [2, Sec. II].
We consider large-scale wireless networks where legitimate
transmitters (interferer nodes) constitute a homogeneous Pois-
son Point Processs (PPPs) Φ with density λ [TXs/m2] in
R2 [12], [13]. Transmitters communicate using antennas with
omni-directional radiation pattern and fixed transmit power.
Let us now consider the set of legitimate transmitters
in an arbitrary region R of area A which thus follows a
Poisson distribution with parameter λA. We then assume
the (composite) fading effect as a random mark associated
with each point of Φ. Using Marking theorem, the resulting
process rΦ “ tpϕ, xq ;ϕ P Φu corresponds to a Marked Point
Process (MPP) on the product space R2 ˆ R`, whose points
(transmitter locations) ϕ belong to the process Φ and the
random variable x refers to the corresponding squared-envelop
of the composite fading, as presented later.
The scenarios under study are interference-limited and
hence the thermal noise is negligible in comparison to the
resulting Co-Channel Interference (CCI) [12], [13]. We recall
that as pointed out by [14] the aggregate interference domi-
nates over AWGN noise and the distribution of the aggregate
interference is positively skewed and heavy tailed, which
suggests a Log-Normal distribution [14]. We assume the high
mobility random walk model, so each observation period can
be analyzed as an independent realization of the MPP [15].
Fig. 1 depicts the network model in a 2D grid. Notice
that the legitimate pair – the tagged transmitter and receiver
– is represented in black (star and square, respectively) and
are separated by a distance of dl. The field of interferers is
denoted by red circles while the eavesdropper is represented
by the blue diamond. We assume that the eavesdropper is at
a known distance de from the tagged transmitter. Through the
framework introduced in [12], [13], we are able to compute
the aggregate interference seen by the receivers.
Radio links are subject to distance-dependent path-loss and
shadowed fading, which is assumed to be independent over
distinct network entities and positions. A signal strength decay
function describes the average power attenuation (unbounded
model) as lpdiq “ d´αi , where α is the path loss exponent and
di represents the distance between a transmitter-receiver pair
with i P tl , eu, which can be either a legitimate receiver or
the eavesdropper.
Each interferer then disrupts the communication of the
tagged receiver with a component given by p lpdqx, where p
represents the interferer’s transmit power, d is the separation
distance from an interferer to the tagged receiver or eavesdrop-
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Fig. 1. Example of the network model. Legitimate pair is represented in black
(square and star) and are separated by a distance dl, while Eve is depicted in
blue (diamond) and at distance de from the tagged transmitter. Note that the
interferers are in red (circles) and that the aggregate power of the interferers
disrupt the communication of the tagged receiver and the eavesdropper.
per. From this assumption, we can compute an approximation
to the distribution of the aggregate interference caused by all
active transmitters, defined by the MPP, as presented in the
next section.
The received squared-envelop due to multipath fading and
shadowing is represented by a Random Variable (RV) X P R`
with Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF), FXpxq, and
Probability Distribution Function (PDF), fXpxq. Then, the
composite distribution of the received squared-envelop due to
Log-Normal (LN) shadowing and Nakagami-m fading has a
Gamma-LN distribution, whose PDF is given as [12], [13]:
fXpxq “
8ż
0
´m
ω
¯m xm´1
Γpmq exp
´
´m
ω
x
¯
(1)
ˆ ξ?
2piσω
exp
«
´
`
ξ lnω ´ µΩp
˘2
2σ2Ωp
ff
dω .
In this case, m is the shape parameter of the Gamma
(Nakagami-m) distribution, Γp¨q is the gamma function [17,
Eq. 8.310-1], ξ “ ln p10q {10, Ωp is the mean squared-envelop,
µΩp and σΩp is the mean and standard deviation of Ωp,
respectively.
Moreover, Ho and Stüber show in [16] that a composite
Gamma–LN distribution can be approximated by a single LN
distribution with mean and variance (in logarithmic scale)
given by µdB “ ξ rψ pmq ´ ln pmqs ` µΩp and σ2dB “
ξ2ζ p2,mq ` σ2Ωp , where ψ pmq is the Euler psi function [17,
Eq. 8.360-1] and ζ p2,mq is the generalized Riemann zeta
function [17, Eq. 9.551].
3III. SECRECY CAPACITY ANALYSIS
The cumulant-based framework from [12, Secs. II, IV and
VII] and [13, Sec.VI] is now used to asses achievable levels
of secrecy and the resulting performance of legitimate link.
Suppose that the legitimate transmitter has only CSI of the
desired receiver, which is known as passive eavesdropping
[3], [7]. In such case, we resort to a probabilistic view of
security in order to characterize the probability of information
leakage to the eavesdropper. Then, in order to protect the
transmission from an inimical attack, we consider the use
of a wiretap code with 2nR codewords, where R is made
equal to the instantaneous capacity of the legitimate channel,
namely Cl [1]. Then, the number of codewords per bin is
set equal to 2nRe , where Re represents the eavesdropper’s
equivocation rate. Thus, a fixed secure transmission rate is
attained as Rs “ R ´ Re “ Cl ´ Re, which implies that
Re “ Cl´Rs varies according to the legitimate channel con-
dition. Therefore, as introduced in [1], an outage event occurs
when Rs exceeds the difference between the instantaneous
capacities of the legitimate and the eavesdropper channels,
thus Pr rrCl ´ Ces` ă Rss, with r¨s` fi maxt¨, 0u.
Let us first characterize the probability of existence of non-
zero secrecy capacity (Pr rCl ą Ces) when the legitimate link
experiences interference from concurrent transmissions. We
use Γl and Γe to denote the SIR of the legitimate and eaves-
dropper links, respectively. Then, the following expression
shows the secrecy capacity of shadowed fading channels
Cs “ rCl ´ Ces` “ rlog p1` Γlq ´ log p1` Γeqs` , (2)
The distributions of Γl and Γe can be recovered using [13,
Th.1].
Theorem 1: For the system model described in this paper
and the distances dl (from the receiver) and de (from the eaves-
dropper) to the tagged legitimate transmitter, the probability
of existence of non-zero secrecy capacity is
Pr rCs ą 0s “ Q
«
µe ´ µla
σ2l ` σ2e
ff
(3)
Proof: The non-zero secrecy capacity probability is
Pr rCs ą 0s “Pr rΓl ą Γes “
8ż
0
γlż
0
fl pγlq fe pγeqdγe dγl, (4)
where Cs is defined in (2), the SIR PDFs fl pγlq and
fe pγeq of the legitimate and eavesdropper nodes follow
Lognormal
`
µl, σ
2
l
˘
and Lognormal
`
µe, σ
2
e
˘
. Integrating in
terms of γe, we have
Pr rΓl ą Γes “
8ż
0
1
2
Erfc
„
µe ´ log pγeq?
2σe

fl pγlqdγl. (5)
Thereafter, we substitute η “ pµe ´ log γeq{
?
2σe in (5)
and adjust the limits of integration accordingly to obtain
Pr rΓl ą Γes “
8ż
´8
e´η2
2
?
pi
Erf
„´µl ` µe `?2ασl?
2σe

dη. (6)
Eq. (3) is obtained from (6) by using [17, Eq. 8.259-1].
We now need to identify the circumstances whereby secrecy
is compromised by defining the secrecy outage probability.
Definition 1: Secrecy Outage Probability is defined as the
probability that the instantaneous secrecy capacity Cs does not
match the target secrecy rate Rs ą 0 and is expressed as [2]:
Pr rCs ă Rss “ Pr rCs ă Rs |Γl ą ΓesPr rΓl ą Γes`
Pr rCs ă Rs |Γl ď ΓesPr rΓl ď Γes . (7)
Theorem 2: For the system model described in this paper,
the secrecy outage probability with respect to the legitimate
link and an arbitrary eavesdropper is given by
Pr rCs ă Rss “ 1
2
´
Nÿ
n“1
ωn
2
?
pi
(8)
ˆ Erf
«
µl ´ log
“´1` 2Rs ` 2Rs exp `µe ´?2ηnσe˘‰?
2σl
ff
.
Proof: Let us start evaluating each summand in (7)
separately. Recall from Theorem 1 that Pr rΓl ą Γes “
Q
”
pµe ´ µlq {
a
σ2l ` σ2e
ı
and since Rs ą 0, it follows that
Pr rCs ă Rs |Γl ď Γes “ 1.
Then, we rewrite the secrecy capacity in terms of its SIR
distribution and then proceed as
Pr rCs ă Rs |Γl ą Γes “
“ Pr rlog2 p1` Γlq ´ log2 p1` Γeq ă Rs |Γl ą Γes
“ Pr “Γl ă 2Rs p1` Γeq ´ 1 |Γl ą Γe‰ . (9)
Under the assumption that legitimate and eavesdropper
channels are independent, one computes (9) as follows.
Pr rCs ă Rs |Γl ą Γes “
“ 1
Pr rΓl ą Γes
8ż
0
p1`γeq´1ż
0
fl pγlq fe pγeqdγl dγe, (10)
where  “ 2Rs . After integrating over γl, we attain
Pr rCs ă Rs |Γl ą Γes “ 1
Pr rΓl ą Γes pΞ1 ´ Ξ2q. (11)
Employing the same method used in the previous proof [17,
Eq. 8.259-1], we have
Ξ1“
8ż
0
fe pγeqErf
„
µl ´ log γe?
2σl

dγe“Q
«
µl ´ µea
σ2l ´ σ2e
ff
, (12)
where the second term is integrated using Gauss-Hermite
quadrature [18] and η “ pµe ´ log γeq {
?
2σe, so that
Ξ2 “
8ż
0
fe pγeqErf
„
µl ´ log p´1` ` γeq?
2σl

dγe
“
Nÿ
n“1
ωn
2
?
pi
Erf
„
µl ´ log r´1` `  ζs?
2σl

, (13)
where ζ “ exp `µe ´?2ηnσe˘. Inserting (3), (12) and (13)
into (11), yields the secrecy outage probability as in (8).
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Fig. 2. Probability of existence of non-zero secrecy capacity as a function
of the perceived SIR at the legitimate receiver for different distance between
legitimate transmitter and eavesdropper de, and density of interfering nodes
λ, considering dl “ 15m.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we apply the framework to evaluate the
feasibility of PHY security in terms of the existence of secrecy
capacity and the outage secrecy probability. Eavesdropper and
legitimate nodes are affected by shadowed fading with the
LN shadowing following a zero-mean Gaussian distribution
with variance σ “ 4, Rician fading factor of K “ 14.8 dB,
and Hermite polynomial order of N “ 24 to evaluate our
performance metrics. We consider that active nodes operate at
a fixed transmit power of 20 dBm.
Fig. 2 depicts the probability of existence of non-zero
secrecy capacity of the legitimate tagged link by varying its
average SIR, eavesdropper distance to the tagged transmitter
and density of interfering nodes for dl “ 15m. We observe
that the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity increases
when the average SIR of the legitimate receiver increases,
whereas it decreases by positioning the eavesdropper close the
legitimate transmitter, namely, de “ 5m away. In other words,
the closer the eavesdropper is to the legitimate transmitter, the
higher should be the link quality of the legitimate pair so as
to guarantee its secrecy.
We can also see from Fig. 2 that the increase of the inter-
ferers’ density decreases the non-zero secrecy capacity proba-
bility for the same average SIR, regardless of the distance de.
This fact evinces that the increase of co-channel interference
caused by increasing λ equally decreases the channel capacity
for both legitimate and eavesdropper links and therefore the
gap between the curves with different densities tends to be
constant when the same distance de is set.
Fig. 3 shows the secrecy outage probability for increasing
secrecy rate Rs, considering that the eavesdropper is at dis-
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Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability as a function of the secrecy rate for
dl “ 5, 10, 15, 20, 25m, while the eavesdropper is positioned de “ 10m
and de “ 15m away from the transmitter.
tance de “ 10 and de “ 15 m. Note that the distance between
the legitimate pair varies with increments of 5 m. We can
infer that secrecy outage probability worsens with the increase
of the distance between the legitimate nodes and also with
the proximity of the eavesdropper to the transmitter. However,
higher secrecy rates can be achieved with shorter legitimate
links once the transmitted signal is much stronger than the
interference seen at the receivers.
V. FINAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSION
We investigated the secrecy capacity of the channel in large
scale, interference-limited networks. Using a more general
model that captures randomness due to interferers’ position,
shadowing and fast fading, we derive closed form expressions
for the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity and secrecy
outage probability. For the proposed scenario, our numerical
results show under which conditions secrecy can be achieved
for different network configurations, evincing the effects of the
proximity of the eavesdroppers to the legitimate transmitter
and the interferer density on the secrecy outage probability.
We plan to continue the investigation introduced in this
paper in scenarios legitimate transmitters use random access
protocols and links are subject to quality constraints. In this
way, we plan to evaluate both the effective secrecy through-
put and the network spatial secrecy throughput, as in [19].
Another extension is to assess the secrecy capacity of Poisson
distributed networks where multi-hop links are allowed [20]
such that the relative positions between relays (defined by
some specific hopping strategy) and eavesdroppers are expect
to impact the system performance.
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